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INTRODUCTION
A fourteen-year-old girl in Winona, Minnesota, recently watched the
movie "Tarantulas: The Deadly Cargo." Allegedly, she went to a pet shop,
purchased one such spider, and placed it in her parents' bed. After discover-
ing the tarantula, the parents informed the juvenile authorities that the girl had
threatened them prior to watching the movie.' The police in East Chicago,
Indiana, foiled a bank hold-up but described it as "a well-planned robbery-
just like in the movies." 2 These two incidents-recent examples of life imitat-
ing art-are neither isolated nor unforeseeable. A steady pattern of such
occurrences has emerged over a number of years.
On September 30, 1973, the movie "Fuzz" was shown on Boston tele-
vision. The movie contained a scene depicting a "wino" being doused with
gasoline and then being set on fire. Two days later, several Boston youths
doused a woman with gasoline and set her on fire. On March 2, 1971, the
movie "Doomsday Flight" was shown on Australian television. The movie
depicted a unique method of extorting money from a major airline. Twenty-
four days following the television showing of the film, an extortion attempt
was made on Quantas Airlines in exactly the same manner as that portrayed in
the movie.4 These two examples are further illustrations of events that have
caused experts in the fields of psychology and sociology to examine whether
the portrayal of particular types of violence on television or in movies
prompts persons to mimic that violence in real life.
This Article suggests that, in certain circumstances, television and movie
producers should be able to predict with reasonable certainty that a harmful,
violent act is likely to result from showing a unique act of violence. The basis
for this conclusion is established by examining sociological and psychological
studies on individual responses to the observation of violence shown on tele-
vision or in movies.5 I believe these studies conclusively establish that a
causal relationship exists and, therefore, legal liability for any resulting harm
should attach. I submit a need exists for either: (1) a new judicially created
tort theory of recovery, or (2) the adoption of a statute designed to impose
liability on the television or movie industry. This Article also discusses the
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possibility of imposing a regulatory scheme of prior restraint on the showing
of predictable harm type behavior.6
I. PREDICTABLE HARM TYPE BEHAVIOR
Generally speaking, the type of behavior portrayed in the media that may
resurface in individual violent acts may be called "predictable harm" type
behavior. It is necessary to clarify at the outset the definite distinction
between the portrayal of "predictable harm" type acts and of generally vio-
lent acts. Admittedly, placing all acts of violence into either a "general" or
"predictable harm" type category is a confusing over-simplification. Never-
theless, with common sense as our guide, we can readily see a difference
between a relatively commonplace punch in the nose-a generally violent
act-and throwing an infant out a twelfth floor window-a predictable harm
type act.
Several characteristics are common to portrayals of predictable harm
type behavior in the media. One characteristic is the rare or uncommon nature
of the depicted act. An example of a rare or unique act is murder by means of
carbon monoxide gas in order to simulate common illness. Further examples
include murder by means of a "magnum" gun rather than an ordinary gun,
assault with a karate blow rather than the more usual fisted punch, and a
stabbing with a machete instead of a more mundane knife.
In many situations, depending on the television or movie plot, unique
acts of violence are accentuated, even glamorized, when performed by a
charismatic leading character-for example, a character portrayed by Clint
Eastwood, Charles Bronson, or Bruce Lee. In the movies "Rebel Without a
Cause" and "West Side Story," the lead characters were glorified by virtue
of their ability to handle switchblade knives in fight scenes. Many similar
examples exist. The significance lies in the impression left with the viewer.
The viewer is led to believe that part of the hero's charisma is his facility at
violence. Depicting ultra-violent acts in conjunction with a hero figure seems
to increase the likelihood that these acts will be mimicked by a viewer at-
tempting to achieve the status of a hero.
Another common characteristic of the method by which "predictable
harm" type acts are portrayed is the detail with which these violent acts are
presented. In order to glorify violent acts, producers and directors go to great
lengths, using, for example, slow-motion, close-ups, or repetitions and
reruns. These techniques saturate viewers with scenes of the act.
The techniques of uniqueness, glamorization, and detail are used by di-
rectors and producers to highlight violence. The net effect reinforces the act
in the viewer's mind, directly increasing the likelihood of reproduction in real
life: real-life imitation of art imitating life.
6. See text accompanying notes 94-108 infra.
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II. PsYCmHu c DATA (THE THEORY)
In order to impose liability upon the television or movie industry, one
must first establish a basis for liability. To proceed by way of common law,
statute, or regulation, it is essential that one establish actual or constructive
knowledge on the part of industry executives that the mere showing of
unique, glamorized, and detailed acts of violence results in a probability that
the violent acts will be reproduced in real life.
General studies provide a plethora of information on the subject of vio-
lence. In 1975, the Rand Corporation collected and published a bibliography
of research on the relationship between television and human behavior. The
corporation uncovered over 2,300 studies or papers on the topic. 7 These
empirical studies demonstrate a definite correlation between the depiction of
violence in the media and audience aggression.
More specifically, in 1964, Leonard Berkowitz authored The Effects of
Observing Violence.! In experiments, he tested the reaction of angered men
to filmed violence. The "unique act" of violence he employed was a boxing
scene from the movie "The Champion." After viewing this violent scene
pitting a protagonist against an antagonist, subjects were given the opportu-
nity to retaliate against insult-hurling co-workers who were actually con-
federates of the author. Berkowitz made the following observation:
The results consistently showed a greater volume of aggression directed against
the anger-arousing confederate by men who had seen the "bad guy" take a beating
than by the men who had been led to feel sympathy for the protagonist in the film.
It was clear the people who saw the justified movie violence had not discharged
their anger through vicarious participation. 9
Berkowitz also considered why aggressive incidents attributable to film-
ed violence are quite infrequent. In this regard, he drew three conclusions:
first, most social situations impose constraints on aggression; second, only
certain people are capable of drawing aggressive responses from a given
person; and third, the predisposition towards aggressiveness translates into
aggression only if appropriate cues are present.'0 Berkowitz's overall conclu-
sion was that:
[T]he major social danger inherent in filmed violence has to do with the temporary
effects produced in a fairly short period immediately following the film. For that
period, at least, a person-whether an adult or a child-who had just seen filmed
violence might conclude that he was warranted in attacking those people in his
own life who had recently frustrated him. Further, the film might activate his
aggressive habits so that for the period of which I speak he would be primed to act
aggressively."
7. See Rivers, TV Violence: Is It Creating Greater Violence in Real Life?, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1976, § 4,
at 8, col. 4.
8. Berkowitz, The Effects of Observing Violence, ScIENTIFIC AM., Feb. 1964, at 35-41.
9. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 40.
11. Id. at 41.
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Similar studies have been done with children as the subjects. One such
study, conducted by 0. Ivan Lovaas, is entitled Effect of Exposure to Sym-
bolic Aggression on Aggressive Behavior.'2 In this study, one group of child-
ren was shown a film depicting an almost continual display of aggression
including hitting and biting. The other group was shown a nonaggressive film
of bears engaging in human-like play. Immediately afterwards, both groups
were observed engaging in a bar pressing response that produced aggressive
doll action. Mr. Lovaas noted:
The study gave evidence of an increase in responding for the aggressive doll action
after exposure to the aggressive film .... The effects of this visual exposure to
symbolic aggression can be conceptualized either in terms of an increase in incen-
tive motivation or in terms of providing discriminative stimuli marking the occa-
sion when aggressive behavior wil be reinforced. '
3
Shortly after the Lovaas study, Bandura and Ross published a study
entitled Imitation of Film-Media Aggressive Models.14Bandura and Ross set
out to test the hypothesis that children exposed to films portraying aggressive
models would react more aggressively to subsequent frustration than children
exposed to real-life aggressive models. The researchers concluded that "there
is strong evidence that exposure to filmed aggression heightens aggressive
reactions in children." 5
The Media Task Force, in conjunction with Professor William R. Catton,
Jr., of the University of Washington, prepared a study 6 analyzing experi-
ments similar to those previously discussed. The analysis found three com-
mon effects evident in almost all studies of reactions to the observation of
violent behavior.' 7 The first effect is the "modeling effect." The.modeling
effect includes those cases in which the observer learns novel responses from
what he has seen.' 8 The second effect is the "disinhibited or inhibited effect,"
which contemplates that existing aggressive responses of the observer may be
strengthened and that existing inclinations toward passivity may be weakened
by the observation of violent behavior.' 9 The third effect is the "eliciting
effect." This effect describes the observer's stimulation to do something he
had already learned to do.2°
Professor Catton also suggests that the reason people often reenact what
they have observed is that "one way to get attention from the television
cameras is to behave in a 'newsworthy' way, which can mean to engage in
12. Lovaas, Effect of Exposure to Symbolic Aggression on Aggressive Behavior, 32 CHILD DEv. 37,
37-44 (1961).
13. Id. at 43-44.
14. Bandura and Ross, Imitation of Film-Media Aggressive Models, 66 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH.
1, 3-11 (1963).
15. Id. at 9.
16. Catton, Mass Media As Activators ofLatent Tendencies, in MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE 301 (1971).






acts of disruption or violence which the television news people are likely to
film for showing on the air."'" The car-bomb killer in St. Louis illustrates this
point. During the last few months of 1977, South St. Louis County was ter-
rorized by an individual planting bombs in automobiles.u The bombs went off
when the ignition was turned on. Dr. Bruce Danto, a police-trained psychia-
trist, was asked to aid investigators. Dr. Danto characterized the killer as "a
skilled, highly calculating loner who derives thrills from reading about his
exploits. ' 23 The planting of car-bombs could have been stimulated in part by
a quest for attention in the media.
There are, of course, some studies that discount the "violence begets
violence" view. A three year, 1.8 million dollar study on the effects of televi-
sion violence resulted in a comprehensive Surgeon General's Report.24
Funded largely by the National Institute of Mental Health, this report grew
out of Senator John Pastore's request for more evidence on whether a link
exists between media violence and anti-social behavior. The summary of the
report stated:
Violence depicted on television can immediately or shortly thereafter induce
mimicking or copying by children.., under certain circumstances television
violence can instigate or increase aggressive acts.
The accumulated evidence, however, does not warrant the conclusion that
televised violence has a uniform adverse effect nor the conclusion that it has an
adverse effect on the majority of children. 25
The cautious language used in the report created its share of con-
troversy. Some people screamed "whitewash." 26 However, the Surgeon
General, Dr. Jessie Steinfield, endorsed the report and later wrote, "[lilt is
clear to me that the causal relationship between televised violence and
antisocial behavior is sufficient to warrant appropriate and immediate
remedial action.",
27
All these studies, even the more cautious ones, indicate that scientific
evidence supports the conclusion that the portrayal in the media of particular
kinds of violence stimulates violent acts in real life. These studies, however,
are controlled laboratory experiments. In order to properly complement the
theories espoused in these studies, it is necessary to cross the line between
theory and reality by documenting actual cases involving predictable harm
type responses following portrayal in the media of uniquely violent acts.
21. Id. at 304.
22. Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 15, 1977, at 34, col. 1.
23. Id. at 34, col. 3.
24. REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL, TELEVISION AND GROWING UP: IMPACT OF TELEVISED
VIOLENCE (1972).
25. Chicago Tribune, Apr. 11, 1972, § 2, at 3. col. 2.
26. Id., Mar. 22, 1972, § 2, at 18, col. 7T.
27. Id.
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Ill. ACTUAL CASES (THE PROOF)
One of the most frequently cited cases of a predictable harm type re-
sponse concerns a 24-year-old woman who was doused with gasoline and set
afire in Boston.28 On Sunday night, September 30, 1973, the American Broad-
casting Company televised the movie "Fuzz." The film contained scenes
of juvenile delinquents burning derelicts to death for enjoyment. On Tuesday,
October 2, 1973, two days after the movie was shown, six youths forced a
24-year-old woman to douse herself with gasoline and they then set her afire.
She died the next day. In a news conference, Police Commissioner Robert J.
DiGuarzia suggested the youths might have been motivated by the aforemen-
tioned movie,29 and went on to say "it's about time that the public demanded
an end to violence such as this in our movies and on television." 30 Moreover,
the following opinion was expressed in an editorial appearing in the New York
Times on October 5, 1973:
The dreadful coincidence cannot be ignored, however much the experts may
continue to argue whether or not violence on the screen begets violence on the
streets. Common sense and social responsibility ought to give the benefit of the
doubt to the counsel against entertainment senselessly polluted with violence.
Dr. Abrahamsen, an acknowledged expert in this field of psychiatry, warned
in his book,"Our Violent Society,"that "Aggression witnessed on television may
serve as a stimulus, a triggering for hostile actions ...." The mindless violence
which more than ever pervades the motion pictures as well as this year's television
programming fits that description.
31
A similar incident occurred in Miami less than two months later. On
October 21, 1973, four teenagers set fire to a sleeping derelict. 2 The derelict
died shortly thereafter. Later that night, the same teenagers set fire to a
second man and tried to burn a third. The following day, three boys were
charged with first-degree murder. Two of the boys were thirteen; the other
was twelve.33
In Fort Lauderdale, on November 12, 1973, a gang of black men abduct-
ed a white man and his wife, doused the husband with a flammable fluid and
set him afire.34 Citing the Boston and Miami incidents, a newspaper article
noted that "[b]oth attacks followed a television showing of the movie 'Fuzz'
which depicted similar violence.
3 5
Another well-documented incident involving predictable harm type be-
havior involved the "Doomsday Flight" imitations. On July 26, 1971, the
movie "The Doomsday Flight" was shown in Canada. The movie plot con-
28. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
29. Id.'at 34, col. 3.
30. Id.
31. Id. Oct. 5, 1973, at 30, cols. 1-2.
32. Id. Oct. 22, 1973, at 27, col. 8.
33. Id. Oct. 23, 1973, at 40, col. 8.
34. Id. Nov. 13, 1973, at 23, col. 1.
35. Id. at 23, col. 2.
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cerned a bomb-hoax plot to extort money from an airline. In the movie, the
extortionist said the plane was carrying a bomb set to detonate when the
airliner flew below a specific altitude; for a price he would inform the officials
of the bomb's location. On August 3, 1971, a British Overseas Airways 747
carrying 379 persons from Montreal to London was diverted to Denver be-
cause a caller said a bomb would detonate when the plane dropped below 5000
feet.36 In a similar incident on March 2, 1971, an individual called Quantas
Airline and said there were bombs designed to be set off by a change in air
pressure aboard one of its 707's. 37 Authorities noted that the incident dupli-
cated the plot of "The Doomsday Flight" shown on March 2.38
In response to bomb threats of this type, the Federal Aviation Admini-
stration asked 500 television stations in 150 cities to refrain from showing
"The Doomsday Flight." John Shaffer, an F.A.A. Administrator, was quoted
as saying, "Our great concern is that the film may have a highly emotional
impact on some unstable individual and stimulate him to imitate the fiction
situation in the movie.",
39
Many television and movie scripts involving robberies have also been
simulated in real life. Two illustrations are the Brink's robbery in Montreal
and the "Shaft" inspired holdup in Chicago.
In the Brink's robbery case, 4 robbers used a heavy machine gun mount-
ed on a tripod in the back of a van to scare a Brink's driver into opening his
armored car. The Montreal police described the weapon as an anti-aircraft
gun. A month earlier, a "Blue Knight" episode had been broadcast in
Toronto. In the episode, two robbers held up an armored car with an anti-tank
gun mounted in the back of a van. The detective in charge, Jean Louis Helie,
said he intended to get in contact with CBS for more details concerning the
"Blue Knight" plot.
41
On August 30, 1972, in Chicago, Illinois, three gunmen invaded a
Japanese restaurant and held fourteen customers hostage for an hour.42 The
youths involved first met in a Chicago theater where "Shaft's Big Score" was
playing. Witnesses in the restaurant described the conduct of the youths:
"The gunmen threatened, kicked, and punched hostages and hurled racial
insults at everyone who was not black .... The young gunmen acted as
though they were acting in a movie." 43 Following the robbery, there ensued a
city-wide police chase, which culminated in the crash of the gunmen's car.
After the incident, police commented that "the violence-laden movie could
36. Id. Aug. 4, 1971, at 66, col. 8.
37. Id. May 27, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
38. Id. Aug. 10, 1971, at 75, col. 2.
39. Id. at 75, col. 8.
40. Chicago-Tribune, Apr. 1, 1976, § I, at 1, col. 2.
41. Id. at 1, col. 4.
42. Id. Aug. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
43. Id. Aug. 31, 1972, § 1, at 2, col. 1.
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have inspired the irrational conduct of the gunmen ... and they pointed out
that a highlight of the movie was a wild chase scene."
44
The foregoing examples are illustrative of volumes of documented cases,
all based on acts of violence portrayed in movies or on television.4 5 Other
cases include a man throwing an infant out of a twelfth floor window claiming
he was inspired by television,'46 and a child suffocating a dog with a pillow
after watching a similar suffocation on television.47 Another documented tele-
vision mimicking episode involved a ransom note scheme in Herrin, Illinois.
A fifty-six year old woman attempted to extort money from individuals who
believed their families were in danger. Under questioning as to her motives
she said, "I did it because I saw it on T.V. I saw a show where a doctor was
asked to pay money to a person, or the doctor's family would be hurt by a
grenade.' 48 A more recent example is the Chowchilla, California, kidnapping
of twenty-six children and their bus driver by three wealthy men from the San
Francisco area. Police believed at one point that the plot originated in the
movie "Dirty Harry." One of the kidnappers did say his planning of the
kidnapping was influenced by television crime shows.49
These incidents point out that the theories espoused in the previous
section have merit. The actual damage caused by constant exposure to vio-
lence in the media has prompted some groups to take some positive steps to
stop it.
IV. PUBLIC RESPONSE TO PREDICTABLE HARM TYPE BEHAVIOR
Public reaction to the reenactment of media violence is varied. There has
been no substantial regulatory action save one which occurred in Los
Angeles.5 0 A citizens watchdog group, the National Association for Better
Broadcasting (NABB), persuaded a Los Angeles television station, KTTV, to
sign an agreement to ban forty-two children's programs and to "graylist"
eighty-one other programs. It has been suggested that the agreement was
signed to avoid a licensing battle spearheaded by NABB.5' This aggreement
included blacklisting some violent cartoons such as "Magilla Gorilla,"
"Ultraman," and "Speed Racer." Among shows "graylisted" as unsuitable
for children were "Batman," "Highway Patrol," "The Untouchables,"
"The Wild, Wild West," and "Mod Squad." The agreement called for a
cautionary announcement before all graylisted shows which read: "Parents-
we wish to advise that because of violence or other possible harmful ele-
44. Id. at 2, col. 1.
45. Liebert, Television and Children's Aggressive Behavior: Another Look, 34(2) AM. J. PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS 99-107 (1974).
46. Chicago Tribune, Apr. 28, 1975, § 1, at 3, col. 4.
47. Id. Oct. 30, 1976, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
48. Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 10, 1978, at 6, col. 1.
49. Id. Jan. 16, 1978, at 18, col. 1.




ments, certain portions of the following program may not be suitable for
young children.,
52
After the agreement between NABB and KTTV was announced, the
reaction among broadcasters and program syndicators was predictably un-
enthusiastic. Worlddivision, a syndication organization, appealed to the FCC
to nullify the unprecedented pact.53 Because many television executives con-
sidered KTTV's pact as "traitorous," ' 4 it is unlikely that ihis method will
again be successful.
Another reaction to the portrayal of violent acts on television comes from
sponsors. The most blatant attack came from Miracle White, a Chicago-based
manufacturer of nonphosphate laundry products. Miracle White stopped all
advertising on violent T.V. programs, cancelling more than seventy commer-
cials on the networks and local stations.5 The company's policy is summa-
rized in remarks made by its president, Leo Singer, at a Lions Club meeting:
Our company, from this day forward, will in no way support any television pro-
gram which in any way promotes violence. . .. We will not advertise on any
show which purports to do so much damage to the people of our country. ... We
feel that it's time that television be shown there is more to life than just profits. We
feel it is time that they're shown that there are some sponsors who care more
about life than just looking at the bottom line.5 6
Miracle White and NABB must be commended for their attempts to curb
television violence. However, one company or group acting alone cannot
adequately reduce violence. To effectively reduce portrayals of unique acts of
violence in the media, legal liability should be imposed on television and
movie companies responsible for airing these violent scenes.
V. IMPOSITION OF LEGAL LIABILITY: NEGLIGENCE
Tort liability for harm resulting from the depiction of unique acts of
violence on television or in the movies could be created by judicial decision or
legislative enactment. In either case, portrayals of predictable harm type
violence resulting in injury could lead to a negligence cause of action, with its
elements phrased as follows:
Any person, partnership, joint venture, or corporation that produces any
work designed to be shown to the public will be liable for the physical
harm caused to a member of the public as a result of the showing of that
work if.
(a) it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries was a reaction by some member of the public




55. The Denver Post, Oct. 24, 1973, at 38, col. 1.
56. Id. at 38, col. 2.
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(b) it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the act that was
reproduced was excessively violent in fact; and
(c) the producers knew or should have known that the depiction of
this violent act created a probability of its being reproduced in society.
Recovery under such a negligence theory would be grounded in a duty of
television and movie producers to produce films and programs free from
unique acts of violence that are or should be known to cause mimicking
responses. This duty would be owed to the general public. When unique acts
of violence are portrayed in the media, the duty is breached and liability
would obtain for resultant harm. Liability under this negligence cause of
action would be based on the television or movie producer's failure to prevent
the unique act of violence from being shown where he knew or should have
known the act might be reproduced.
Most troublesome in the above negligence analysis is the element of
causation. Admittedly, this is a difficult obstacle to overcome. Tort liability
requires proof that the defendant television or movie producer caused an
injury to the plaintiff.57 Nevertheless, courts have been willing to extend the
causation element in order to establish protracted liability for negligence. An
example is found in Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. 8 In that case, a rock radio
station conducted a contest that rewarded the first contestant who could find
a peripatetic disc jockey. While responding to clues broadcast by the radio
station, two minors in excited pursuit of the disc jockey negligently forced a
car off the highway, killing its sole occupant. The jury found the defendant
radio station liable for negligence. In affirming the jury verdict, the Supreme
Court of California stated:
If the likelihood that the third person may react in a particular manner is a hazard
which makes the actor negligent, such reaction whether innocent or negligent does
not prevent the actor from being liable for the harm caused thereby. Here, reckless
conduct by youthful contestants, stimulated by defendant's broadcast, constituted
a hazard to which decedent was exposed.59
This accepted view of protracted causation could likewise embrace a
predictable harm event. The media, by showing unique, detailed, and glamor-
ized incidents of violence, knowingly create a hazard that a viewer may
imitate unique violence. Because the viewer's behavior is foreseeable, 60 the
viewer's act is not the superceding cause of harm to the victim. 6' The media's
stimulating presentation of violence is the cause, and the media should be
liable for the harm that results.
It is especially appropriate that media corporations be held financially
57. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971).
58. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
59. Id. at 47, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (emphasis added) (citations ommitted).
60. See text accompanying notes 7-49 supra.
61. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 43-44 (4th ed. 1971).
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responsible, whether by legislative act or judicial decision, for harm caused to
an innocent victim. These corporations profit from the very presentation of
violence that causes the victim's harm. In a just and fair system, profit from
an activity should be made available to compensate the victim of that activity.
A judicial or legislative theory of tort recovery for "predictable harm,"
therefore, seems both plausible and appropriate. Another possible means of
remedy for this problem would be a statutory or regulatory scheme prohibit-
ing the media depiction of uniquely violent acts.62 Both tort liability for and
prior restraint of media presentations, however, present possible collisions
with first amendment freedoms. Nevertheless, the problems seem resolvable.
VI. PREDICTABLE HARM AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Although first amendment 63 rights are given great deference by the
courts, it is well established that the right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances.64 Even in a society which regards freedom
of speech as one of its cherished possessions, the interest in complete free-
dom of expression must be reconciled with other fundamental rights of the
citizenry through the process of comparison that has come to be called
balancing.65
First amendment obstacles are avoided in a negligence cause of action for
predictable harm from media violence because, owing to the causal connec-
tion between visual violence and antisocial behavior, the type of speech at
issue should not be protected by the first amendment. In this instance, free-
dom of speech is outweighed by the citizens' interest in personal safety and
law and order. To substantiate this argument, three types of unprotected
speech-obscenity, defamation and fighting words-are examined. The
rationale for not protecting these types of speech leads to the inescapable
conclusion that predictable harm type speech should likewise be unpro-
tected.
Another problem related to whether predictable harm should be outside
the scope of the first amendment is how a regulatory scheme or tort liability
should be implemented. Consequently, the applicability of the judicially
created concepts of clear and present danger and prior restraint will also be
discussed.66
A. Obscenity
In Roth v. United States,67 the appellant was convicted of violating
62. See text accompanying notes 95-108 infra.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
64. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
65. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590-94 (1969);
American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 393-400 (1950); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).
66. See text accompanying notes 94-108 infra.
67. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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federalP and state statutes69 prohibiting "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or
indecent material from being mailed or written." The Supreme Court
upheld the conviction and stated as part of its holding that "obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press. ' 70 The Court
recognized that "ideas having even the slightest redeeming social impor-
tance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties,
unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests,' M but concluded that obscenity is utterly without
redeeming social importance.72
Does the visual depiction of a woman being doused with gasoline, or of a
unique way to hijack an airplane, or of an unusual method of poisoning some-
one's food, have redeeming social importance? Many psychologists, sociol-
ogists, and other behavioral scientists have shown a correlation between the
observation of an act of violence and its subsequent commission by the indi-
vidual.73 If the correlation exists, it becomes necessary to balance the social
benefit of showing unique acts of violence against the ultimate harm to
society. Of course, because the balancing test is here applied only to "unique
acts of violence" and not to depictions of "ordinary violence," the first
amendment guarantees of free speech will be weighed against resulting
behavior which is clearly antisocial and harmful.
The problem presented is not unique. The proponents of censoring ob-
scenity faced the identical two-step analysis involved here. First, it was
necessary to establish the causal connection between antisocial behavior and
obscenity. Second, it was necessary to prove that speech resulting in anti-
social behavior does not warrant first amendment protection.
Concern for public safety and public morals pervades the law of obscen-
ity. The proponents of censoring obscene materials assert that a connection
exists between sexually explicit expression and behavior that the state has a
duty to punish and prevent. 74 And although this connection between obscen-
ity and its alleged antisocial effect is elusive, 75 the courts still uphold convic-
tions in obscenity cases. 76 Therefore, the less elusive causal connection
between visual violence and antisocial behavior should not prevent courts
from meeting their duty to hold responsible those who create harm to others
through the portrayal of unique acts of violence in the media.
If media portrayals of unique acts of violence are not considered consti-
68. Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 768 (1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. 1461 (1976)).
69. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (vest 1955).
70. 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1958).
71. Id. at 484 (1958).
72. Id.
73. See text accompanying notes 7-27 supra.
74. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,58 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,567 (1969).
75. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-62 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566-67
(1969).
76. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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tutionally protected speech, proof of a causal connection supporting "predict-
able harm" legislation will be sufficient if there exists a rational basis for
believing the asserted causal link between showing a "unique act of violence"
and its subsequent reenactment.77 In spite of conflicting interpretations of the
empirical data, many researchers have concluded that this causal connection
does exist.78 Consequently, a rational basis for "predictable harm" legislation
cannot be doubted. The causal connection is between portrayals of predict-
able harm type violence and behavior that is indisputably antisocial. The
conclusion that portrayals of unique violence should be constitutionally un-
protected is the next step in the analysis.
B. Fighting Words
The fighting words doctrine is illustrated by the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire.79 In 1942, a
Jehovah's Witness named Chaplinsky was arrested on a public street while
distributing literature denouncing all religion. Chaplinsky called the arresting
officer a "god damned racketeer" and a "damned fascist," and said the
"whole government of Rochester are fascists or agents of fascists. "' Affirm-
ing defendant's conviction for violating a state statute and refuting defend-
ant's first amendment argument, the Supreme Court stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the preven-
tion and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well-observed that
such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.8 '
Chaplinsky was decided in 1942, fifteen years prior to Roth v. United States,
82
yet the same inquiries into the social value of the speech sought to be
protected were made in both cases.83
There are striking similarities between fighting words and media depic-
tions of unique violence. Both are of slight social value and both foreseeably
incite violence and harm. These similarities lead to the conclusion that
presentation of predictable harm type behavior, like fighting words, should
not be protected by the first amendment. The statute's purpose in Chaplinsky
77. "'Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene
material, the legislature of Georgia could quite reasonably conclude that such a connection does or might exist."
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973).
78. See text accompanying notes 7-27 supra.
79. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
80. Id. at 569.
81. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (emphasis added).
82. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
83. Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,481-85 (1957), with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
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like the cause of action proposed here, is to preserve the public peace; no
words were "forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of
violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is addressed."
' 4
The Chaplinsky statute sought to prohibit only speech that had a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence. Predictable harm liability would likewise
seek to except from first amendment protection visual displays having a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence. Moreover, the effects of visual violence
tend to be immediate, the same result sought to be checked by the statute held
constitutional in Chaplinsky.85
C. Defamation
In Beauharnais v. Illinois,8 6 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of an Illinois group libel statute on the grounds that,
"[Il]ibelous utterances [are] not.., within the area of constitutionally
protected speech.",87 The Court went on to include libel in the same class of
unprotected speech as obscenity.8s
Since 1952, several important Supreme Court decisions have affected the
law of defamation.89 That the Court has narrowed this unprotected area is not
to be denied. However, like obscenity and fighting words, defamation, with
its myriad of decisions concerning what standards of proof are applicable, 90
nevertheless remains a form of unprotected speech in circumstances not
covered by these limited decisions. 9'
It is beyond this Article's scope to detail the many intricacies of the law of
defamation. For our purposes it suffices to point out that defamatory expres-
sion is sometimes unprotected by the first amendment.92 Moreover, when
defamatory speech receives first amendment protection, the protection is
based not on the value of the defamation, but rather is the result of our
zealous guard against encroachments on protected speech.93 With regard to
unprotected media showings of unique violence, certain restrictions are like-
wise necessary in order to preserve the integrity of the first amendment.
D. Censoring Presentations of Predictable Harm Type Material
If certain types of violence depicted in the media may be subjected to
84. 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (citing New Hampshire v. McConnell, 70 N.H. 294, 47 A. 267 (1"900); New
Hampshire v. Brown, 68 N.H. 200, 38 A. 731 (1895)).
85. 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942).
86. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
87. Id. at 266.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
90. See cases cited in note 89 supra.
91. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 118 (4th ed. 1971).
92. Id.
93. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-42 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 152-54 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964); BeVier, The First Amendment




some form of review that is constitutionally permissible, in what manner
should a predictable harm standard be implemented? Generally speaking,
there are two avenues of approach that can be utilized to reach the desired
result of preventing this antisocial behavior. The first approach, previously
discussed, is to impose tort liability subsequent to a showing of unique media
violence. Conversely, there is the possibility of restraining the undesirable
portion of the movie from being shown prior to its release. This second option
would prevent the showing of the unique act of violence by censoring or
editing the particular scenes out of the television program or movie. Admit-
tedly, prior restraint of expression is generally despised, and "a free society
prefers to punish the few who abuse the right of speech after they break the
law than to throttle them and all others beforehand." '," The prior restraint
method of preventing predictable harm therefore presents unique constitu-
tional problems.
Notwithstanding the fact that the doctrine of prior restraint imposes a
heavy burden upon the government to justify its prior interference with
expression, the belief that all prior restraints are prohibited is conceptually
too broad, for "the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely
unlimited."'9
In Freedman v. Maryland,' the Supreme Court held a motion pic-
ture censorship statute97 unconstitutional for not complying with certain
"procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship
system." 98 These procedural safeguards include the following:
First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on
the censor. . . . Second, while the State may require advance submission of all
films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films, the
requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of
finality to the censor's determination whether a film constitutes protected expres-
sion. . . [Finally,] the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial deci-
sion, to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial
of a license.
99
Known as the Freedman test, these procedural safeguards have been applied
to areas outside of movie censorship statutes.1° The test fortifies the belief
that certain unique acts of violence could be censored and still conform with
first amendment freedom of speech requirements.
In addition, the clear and present danger test formulated by the Supreme
Court indicates that injunctions against speech are constitutional under
94. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975); accord, Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
95. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,54 (1965) (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697,715 (1931)).
96. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
97. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 66A, § 2 (1957).
98. 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
99. Id. at 58-59.
100. See Murphy, The Prior Restraint Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 51 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 898 (1976).
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certain circumstances. In Schenck v. United States,'' defendants were con-
victed of advocating disruption of governmental recruitment during the First
World War. Despite first amendment objections to allowing Congress to make
any law abridging freedom of speech, Mr. Justice Holmes reasoned:
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from
an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.... The
question in every case is whether the words used are used in ... such a nature as
to create a clear andpresent danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. 102
It was this language that spawned the "clear and present danger" test.
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all the changes in the clear
and present danger doctrine over the past fifty-nine years, but a few points
should be noted. First, the clear and present danger doctrine applies only to
protected speech.'0 3 Hence, if these unique acts of violence are considered
unprotected speech, as proposed earlier, the clear and present danger test is
inapplicable. Alternatively, even if presentation of predictable harm type con-
duct is considered protected speech, depiction of these unique acts of vio-
lence causes a substantive evil-reenacted violence-that Congress has a
right to prevent. Hence, the clear and present danger test is satisfied, and
such presentations could be prohibited.
The Freedman test and the "clear and present danger" test directly
concern certain types of speech and whether they should or should not be
censorable. Of equal importance is the regulation of the noncommunicative
aspect of speech. The basic test is that the regulation must further an impor-
tant governmental interest unrelated to suppressing the message being com-
municated.'04 Moreover, that regulation must only incidently restrict speech
and the restriction must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
the governmental interest in question.'0 5
Examples of valid regulations that incidentally affect speech are an
ordinance making it a misdemeanor to solicit business at a private residence
without obtaining the owner's prior consent,"° a narrowly drawn ordinance
prohibiting loud sound trucks on the streets,1°7 and a statute banning distribu-
tion of commercial handbills on the streets to avoid littering.'0t The "impor-
tant governmental interests" involved in these examples include the right to
101. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
102. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
103. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). For the normative side of this question, see BeVier,
The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 SrAN. L.
REV. 299, 339 (1978); Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg
Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1169 (1970).
104. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
105. Id.
106. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 624-25 (1951).
107. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
108. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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privacy, noise control, and litter prevention. The governmental interests
underlying regulation of the presentation of predictable harm type conduct
would be the prevention of murder, rape, robbery, and extortion. These inter-
ests are more essential than the protection of privacy, noise control, and
littering. Moreover, a statute or regulatory scheme prohibiting only media
presentations of unique acts of violence would minimally restrict media ex-
pression and impose the least regulation necessary to protect the govern-
ment's interest. Thus, such a statute or regulation would be constitutionally
permissible under this noncommunicative impact analysis, as well as under a
clear and present danger analysis, if enacted with the Freedman test proce-
dural safeguards.
VII. CONCLUSION
As evidenced throughout this Article, media people should know that
harmful, violent acts portrayed in their productions create a likelihood that
the acts may be reproduced in real-life. Admirably, plaintiffs have initiated
suits based on "predictable harm" type fact patterns.' °9 It is now time to take
the next step towards preventing the media from hiding behind the first
amendment when their productions result in severe injuries.
It is now incumbent on the legislative branch of government to draft a
statutory scheme or regulation that prohibits harmful presentations of unique
media violence or insures that plaintiffs injured as a result of violent imitation
of a media production will have a means of seeking relief. It is likewise
incumbent upon our judicial system to approve a recovery mechanism that
will afford victims of predictable harm type violence compensation from those
who profit by the commercial presentation of material that predictably causes
harm.
109. See, e.g., Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1977), stay
denied sub nom. National Broadcasting Co. v.Niemi,434 U.S. 1354(1978) (Rehnquist, Cir.J.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1000 (1978).
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